# Economia dello sviluppo

## Prof. Lucia Corno

***OBIETTIVO DEL CORSO E RISULTATI DI APPRENDIMENTO ATTESI***

Il corso mira a fornire agli studenti gli strumenti di base teorici ed empirici per comprendere le determinanti della crescita economica e dello sviluppo economico. Il corso analizzerà i principali vincoli allo sviluppo, quali accumulazione di capitale umano e fisico (cioè istruzione, salute, accesso al credito, corruzione, norme sociali etc.), così come le caratteristiche principali delle politiche di lotta alla povertà implementate dalle Organizzazioni Internazionali, come la Banca Mondiale. Il corso si propone di fornire strumenti teorici e analitici per (i) imparare a leggere articoli/documenti in economia dello sviluppo con uno sguardo critico e interpretare la letteratura in questo campo; (ii) comprendere i recenti dibattiti in economia dello sviluppo; (iii) sviluppare un pensiero critico sulle politiche pubbliche dei paesi in via di sviluppo; (iv) imparare le metodologie alla base della ricerca in economia nei paesi in via di sviluppo.

***PROGRAMMA DEL CORSO***

– Come misurare lo sviluppo economico?

– Come misurare l’efficacia dei programmi di sviluppo? RCTs e DID

– Istruzione

– Salute

– Il mercato della terra

– Il mercato del credito

– Le istituzioni

– Corruzione

– Conflitti

– Diversità etnica

– Media e sviluppo

– Norme sociali

– La famiglia

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\*Papers obbligatori

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Banerjee A., Duflo E, Poor Economics, Public Affairs 2011 (da ora BD)

*Topic 1: Come misurare lo sviluppo economico?*

Capitolo 2 and Capitolo 8 (fino 8.3) - DR

Capitolo 1-2 - BD

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*Topic 2: Come misurare l’efficacia dei programmi di sviluppo? RCTs e DID*

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*Topic 3: Istruzione*

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*Topic 5: Il mercato della terra*

\*DR, ch. 12

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\*Banerjee, A., P. Gertler and M. Ghatak (2002), “Empowerment and efficiency: Tenancy reform in West Bengal”, Journal of Political Economy, 110(2), 239-280.

\*Field, E. (2007), “Entitled to Work: Urban Property Rights and Labor Supply in Peru”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(4), 1561–1602.

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*Topic 6: Il mercato del credito e la microfinanza*

\*Stiglitz, J. and A. Weiss (1981), “Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information”, American Economic Review, 71, 393-410.

\*Aleem, I. (1993), “Imperfect information, screening, and the costs of informal lending: A study of a rural credit market in Pakistan”, in K. Hoff, A. Braverman and J. Stiglitz (eds.), The Economics of Rural Organization, Oxford University Press.

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*Topic 7: Storia, sviluppo economico e il ruolo delle istituzioni*

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*Topic 8: Corruzione*

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*Topic 9: Conflitti*

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*Topic 11: Media e sviluppo*

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***DIDATTICA DEL CORSO***

Lezioni frontali

***METODO E CRITERI DI VALUTAZIONE***

Esame scritto finale con domande aperte composte da esercizi e teoria di circa 1,5-2 ore. Non è prevista la prova parziale.

Il voto sarà composto per il 20% da una presentazione in classe in inglese di un articolo nella reading list non segnato con \* e per l’80% da un esame scritto.

Il voto dell’esame scritto varra’ per il 100% solo dall’appello di luglio in avanti.

***AVVERTENZE E PREREQUISITI***

È consigliata la conoscenza degli argomenti e degli strumenti di base della microeconomia, statistica e econometria.

*Materiale*

Le slides e gli articoli verranno caricati sulla pagina personale del docente.

1. I testi indicati nella bibliografia sono acquistabili presso le librerie di Ateneo; è possibile acquistarli anche presso altri rivenditori. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)